
HOW TO
TURN NON-MARKET TAXES INTO MARKET ONES:
CASE STUDY OF THE ROAD SECTOR
Functioning of the
market mechanism within the road sector has some peculiarities that lead to governmental
intervention in the decision-making process concerning road network development and its
operation. Measures of governmental regulation should ensure a timely adoption of
appropriate laws and economic norms, as well as allotment of necessary budget means. An
insufficient development of a motor road network can impede effective functioning of many
branches of economy, which will certainly affect the rate of economic growth of a country.
Thus, sustainable
development and effective performance of a road network are a necessary condition for
stabilisation, recovery and restructuring of an economy, guarantee of integrity and
national security, improvement of living conditions of the population.
Stable financial
support given to development of a motor road network is the main condition of achievement
of the necessary volumes of its development. Disputes about road branch efficiency and
methods of road financing have a history of several hundred years, first arising when
people started to spend money on creation of conditions making for an easy transportation.
It is clear, though, that the choice in favour of this or that model of financing is
conditioned not only by the economic situation in a country. To get people pay more for an
ineffective use is to render the game fair. It means that the dues for road use should
depend on effectiveness of their use.
At the stage of
stabilisation of the economy a necessary level of financing can be achieved through
improvement of the existing system of road sector financing. A critical attitude expressed
by some international financial organisations towards the way the road funds in the
Russian Federation are formed and the experience of financing of road sectors in other
countries were assimilated by the Russian Ministry of Economics and the Duma to produce a
project of a new Taxation Code according to which the road user tax will gradually
decrease and will be eventually cancelled by the year of 2002.
The acuteness of the
problem is reinforced by the following dilemma: on the one hand, the above mentioned tax
fills from 75 to 85% of the territorial road funds, and its cancellation will lead to a
complete destruction of the branch; on the other hand, the tax is really unfair because it
is paid regardless of the results of activity, and, what is even worse, without
consideration of road use intensity.
As a result a lot of taxpayers think that its size
is not proportional to their intensity of road use as compared to the unquestionable in
this regard tax on realisation of fuel and grease materials.
The
roots of this contradiction are of rather a psychological nature. This kind of tax is
justified from the economic point of view since the road sector, just as any other infrastructure,
creates certain conditions for business and household activity that are worth something.
There is no arguing about that. What is open for discussion is how mush this something
is? Or it is more about ignoring the subject.
A lot
of users (especially corporate ones) think that investments to a road network do not cost
them anything, because they get nothing in return. This point of view,
shared by opponents of road taxes, has a right to exist since the current system of
bookkeeping and statistics does not imply any calculation of the benefits they receive in
the form of better conditions for business activity as a result of improvement of, for
example, repaired roads.
The
core of the market system is calculation of benefits in general and by sources of their
generation. Every service should become rightful merchandise, which is not possible
without the benefits being targeted on certain groups of users. This was obvious to
J. Dupuis, a French economist, who already at the be beginning of the XIX century holding
position of the director of the Paris road department published his work entitled On
usefulness of civil construction, where he emphasised the difference between
the importance of a project and its usefulness, and by doing so he showed that capital
investments to roads should be compared on the basis of end consumption, or general
benefits.
By the
way, one of the reasons for road funds to be earmarked for a special purpose is that it is
impossible to make every user calculate benefits from improvement of a road network in
order to estimate a reasonable share of means to be allotted for the road sector from the
budget. It is possible to do so for the army, courts and other state purposes, but the
roads are financed from the budget residues.
That
is why the efforts to consolidate road funds and the budget undertaken in some regions of
Russia (and even countries) conflict with the economic principles of the road
infrastructure.
The
key question is how to ensure that the user tax depends on the results of users’
activity, in other words, how to turn the user tax into a market one? In order to give a
right answer we need to realise clearly what a market tax is.
Since
there is no way to make the user report back about the benefits arising from his
consumption of certain road services (though he sees them for himself in the form of
decrease in fuel consumption and amortisation due to a good condition of the roads), the
way out can be as follows.
Since
the best transport conditions for the population’s sake are created by the government
(namely, federal, regional and local agencies) with the help of loans raised from
enterprises (in the form of the road user tax), then a market approach would be the one
when the borrower pays off the loan not only on time (the first condition), but also with
interest (the second condition). In other
words a road fund (as an accumulated loan) should be profitable, and the same goes for the
road sector. Therefore, for all taxpayers the benefits from development of a road network
are an increase in G.D.P. (gross domestic product) of the service and manufacturing
sector, which is outside the transport system. Thus, the road user tax is a payment, even
though indirect, for the use of roads. And it should be differentiated according the
effectiveness of this use.
Charging
the issue of state profitability of the road sector (in our opinion, a complete
profitability of an infrastructure can be only a state one) we were fully aware of the
fact that there were absolutely no economic data to be found on the state level to help us
make quick and reliable calculations. At the present moment, when transport and
communications are treated as a whole, it seems to be a very difficult task. That is why
for almost 10 regions Geogracom has assessed “state” profitability on the level of
subbranches and not enterprises.
The
essence of the approach is as follows: all subbranches consuming the services of the road
sector should do it effectively regardless of the intensity of use (measured in ton-km or
passenger-km). For example, railwaymen, coal-miners, dockers, power engineering
specialists, and others plead that they do not use roads practically at all. However,
there must be at least small return. If there is something, the tax will be less, if there
is no benefit – the tax goes high making the user pay for his inability or simply
unwillingness to use effectively extra resources in the form of better transport
conditions. This approach has a lot in common with the rent II (by C. Marx), which is in
principle close to the nature of an infrastructure, but we are not going to digress from
our subject.
The basic
principle has been defined. The biggest part of the profit should go to the state for the
purposes of massive generation of road services. Though it should be explained that the
word ‘profit’ is used in an indirect sense. Yes,
enterprises get profit in the form of a lower prime cost of their products (due to
decrease in the road component), but since, as it was already mentioned, they do not
calculate this effect, the ‘profit’ can be estimated theoretically - in the form of
increase in G.D.P. stimulated by an exclusive use of the road services. The solution of
the problem comes down to estimation of the net contribution of motor roads to G.D.P.
A
logical scheme of estimation of motor road contribution to G.D.P. can be as follows (see
Table 1):
1. Selection
of the branches that depend the most on motor road condition; estimation of the
contribution made by each branch to G.D.P.;
2. Estimation
of the motor road share in prime cost of the products of these branches. The usual
conception of G.D.P. growth by means of a road network is only another way of expressing
reduction of freight capacity of economy (unit freight turnover per US$1 of G.D.P.), which
is demonstrated by bringing down the prime cost of the products of the economy branches
along with the development of a road network. The regression analysis is considered to be
the most popular method for estimation of motor road influence on prime cost (cost) of
goods and services. Analysis of resulting equations allows one to get a concrete degree of
motor road influence on prime cost of various goods (see column 4 of Table 1). In the
course of the study of 20 regions of Russia and the CIS Geogracom defined typical shares
of motor roads in prime cost of the products for different branches of economy. These data
are now used for further calculations (see Table 2);
3. Organisation
of the obtained results according to the G.D.P. structure, and comparison of these results
with the level of commercial use of a motor road network (see column 6 of Table 1).
4. The
index called "state profitability" is calculated as a difference between results
and costs, or as a ratio of results to costs. In this case results are given in the form
of total contribution of motor roads to state or regional economy; and the costs are
presented as taxpayers' resources, state subsidies and grants – which is, in other
words, the money allotted for maintenance and development of a motor road network. The
index of "state profitability" shows which part of the expenditure is returned
in the form of profit received during one planning period. It is possible to make a
judgement about operational efficiency of the road sector by analysing the calculated
value of this index. Any positive value (or more than 1) clearly speaks in favour of state
support of the road sector.
None of the 10
regions, where a detailed study was undertaken, showed a negative result. For example, in
Kazakhstan the value of “state” profitability is 1,3% of G.D.P., in the Sverdlovsk
oblast – 0,96%, in the Nizhni Novgorod oblast – 1,16%, Sakha-Yakutia – 0,4%. The
advantage of this criterion is simplicity of its calculation. Therefore, this index can be
recommended as a limit to making decisions about financing.
5. In order to
estimate a relative effectiveness of motor road use demonstrated by different branches of
economy, it is necessary to calculate the ratio of results to costs, that is to define the
ratio of the contribution made by motor roads to G.D.P. of a certain branch to the level
of commercial use of a road network. The level of commercial use is the share of freight
turnover by the automobile transport of a branch in the total freight turnover of all
branches.
Geogracom analysed
the results of the calculations made for the Ryazan oblast within the elaboration of the
Programme of the motor road network development. The analysis showed that potential
contribution of the motor roads to G.D.P. of the region exceeds the motor road costs by
1,09 % of G.D.P. Effectiveness of motor road use varies depending on an economy branch
(Table 1, column 8). Roads are used most effectively by agricultural enterprises, food
processing industry and communications sector. At the same time roads are used
ineffectively by quite a big number of branches (the index of relative effectiveness is
less than 1). Therefore, the road user tax rate should be flexible and differentiated by
branches, which means it should be fixed depending on the effectiveness of motor road use.
The branches that do not use roads effectively should make up for such a situation by
bigger contributions to the state budget.
The logic of fixing
the tax rate is as follows: the more effectively a sub-branch uses motor roads (i.e. the
higher is the value of the index in column 8), the lower should be the tax rate for this
branch. In particular, a "fair" tax rate for communications enterprises that
demonstrate a highly effective use of motor roads (16,09) could be the lowest one –
0,75%. On the other hand, automobile transportation companies use motor roads
ineffectively. Thus, it is their duty to compensate for an ineffective motor road use by
3,22% of the tax rate.
As it can be seen
from Table 1, the tax rate is fixed between 0,75% and 3,25%. Therefore, should the
differentiated tax rates be introduced, the transportation branch and the manufacture
enterprises would face the biggest tax rates since they use roads most ineffectively.
The fair market
approach is about making the user pay more for a worse use of additional resources, in
this case – an improved road network. Such flexibility has undisputed advantages, since
the tax being self-regulating does not require correction of the legislation.
Self-regulating taxes
are gaining ground all over the world, and Russia is no exception. Notably, The Ministry
of Taxes is elaborating a tax on additional income (TAI) from exploitation of hydrocarbon
in the oil extraction branch. The idea is that TAI will have a “sliding” rate for each
deposit site, and the rate will change according to profitability of oil extraction. Such
an approach to the road user tax will make it possible to maintain the basic parameters of
the road tax policy and will attract some part of non-transport effect which appears in
the state (regional) economy as a result of improvement of road conditions and which
cannot be attributed directly to user taxes.
Advantages of various
financing systems (concession, budget or fund (road funds) financing) have been a subject
for a dispute in the road sector already for a decade. A whole day was devoted to
discussion of this issue at the XXY European Transport Forum [2]. However, the problem of self-regulation of road
taxes was not on the agenda.
Of cause, the
approach suggested by Geogracom is not impeccable. First of all it concerns initial data
and co-operation with statistics agencies that provide them. Nevertheless, they do possess
all the information necessary for calculation.
Further improvement of the road branch financing
system should go as far as making direct users pay back a certain part of other external
costs related to environmental pollution, road accidents, congestion, etc. These costs are
considered to be external effects and are not taken into consideration by road users. But
in order to offset pollution abatement costs it is necessary to introduce a special tax or
create another instruments for this purpose. A lot of economists speak in favor of such
“market based” tools enhancing economic effectiveness, because they believe them to be
a less “capital intensive” means of achievement the goal, which is in this case
improvement of the ecological situation. In Great Britain the controller is the difference
between the price of petrol with lead and that of lead-free petrol.
Moreover, one of the
applied instruments can be special letters of permission allowing a certain degree of
pollution over a fixed period of time. It will be possible to regulate pollution by
issuing a limited number of such permissions [3, 4].
One of the main effects from improvement of a road network (including congestion
liquidation) is decrease in loss of drivers’ and passengers’ free time. A tax in favor
of network development (regional dues) can be in the form of an absolute sum set for a
single parameter (1 working person) for a certain period of time (one year). The effect
from free time saving possible because of improvement of a road network can be estimated
with the help of expert system Geogracom 5W [5].
Table 1. Economic
contribution of the motor roads to the economy branches on the
Ryazan oblast.
Branches |
G.D.P. |
Branch
share in G.D.P., % |
Road
share in prime cost, % |
Road
share in branch G.D.P., % |
Subbranch
share in total contribution of roads, % |
Level
of commercial use of road network |
Relative
effectiveness of road use, % |
Road
user tax rate, % |
Industry,
including.: |
4585,4 |
34,8 |
|
1,558 |
51,645 |
41,4 |
1,247 |
|
Fuel-producing |
792,9 |
6,025 |
0,3 |
0,018 |
0,599 |
3,4 |
0,176 |
3,1 |
Electric
power |
1603,6 |
12,186 |
0,3 |
0,037 |
1,212 |
14 |
0,087 |
3,1 |
Iron
and steel |
844 |
6,414 |
0,3 |
0,019 |
0,8 |
0,3 |
2,126 |
2,25 |
Non-ferrous
metals |
110,9 |
0,843 |
0,3 |
0,003 |
0,08 |
0,05 |
1,676 |
2,25 |
Chemicals
and oil |
3,96 |
0,03 |
0,3 |
0,009 |
0,003 |
1,1 |
0,003 |
3,25 |
Mechanical
engineering and metal-working |
343 |
2,607 |
5,19 |
0,135 |
4,484 |
9,3 |
0,482 |
2,6 |
Timber |
33,4 |
0,254 |
2,9 |
0,007 |
0,244 |
2,7 |
0,09 |
3,1 |
Construction
materials |
260,4 |
1,979 |
0,3 |
0,006 |
0,197 |
4,8 |
0,04 |
3,25 |
Consumer
goods |
67,2 |
0,511 |
0,3 |
0,002 |
0,051 |
0,7 |
0,73 |
2,25 |
Food
processing |
309 |
2,348 |
56,5 |
1,327 |
43,974 |
4,7 |
9,356 |
2,25 |
Flour-grinding
and mixed feed |
115,8 |
0,98 |
0,3 |
0,003 |
0,088 |
0,4 |
0,219 |
3 |
Others |
101,24 |
0,724 |
0,3 |
0,002 |
0,072 |
0,005 |
14,4 |
0,75 |
Agriculture |
2840,7 |
21,6 |
|
1,211 |
40,137 |
18,2 |
2,205 |
2,25 |
Livestock
breeding |
474,8 |
3,6 |
0,3 |
0,011 |
0,358 |
|
|
|
Plant-growing |
2365,9 |
18 |
|
1,187 |
39,342 |
|
|
|
including |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
grain |
405,3 |
3,1 |
0,3 |
0,009 |
0,308 |
|
|
|
potatoes |
350,4 |
2,7 |
20,9 |
0,564 |
18,704 |
|
|
|
sugar-beet |
9,87 |
0,08 |
24,69 |
0,02 |
0,655 |
|
|
|
vegetables |
1021,6 |
7,8 |
7,61 |
0,594 |
19,675 |
|
|
|
Other
agricultural branches |
588,6 |
4,4 |
0,3 |
0,013 |
0,438 |
|
|
|
Construction |
802,42 |
6,1 |
0,3 |
0,018 |
0,607 |
17,6 |
0,034 |
3,25 |
Other
branches |
85,3 |
0,6 |
0,3 |
0,002 |
0,06 |
2,8 |
0,021 |
3,25 |
Market
services |
3513,7 |
26,7 |
0,3 |
0,2 |
6,547 |
20 |
0,327 |
2,9 |
Transport
and Communications
|
1340,8 |
10,2 |
0,3 |
0,148 |
4,906 |
|
|
|
including |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
communications |
43,4 |
3,237 |
0,3 |
0,01 |
0,322 |
0,02 |
16,093 |
0,75 |
automobile
transportation |
46,62 |
0,4 |
29,65 |
0,119 |
3,931 |
18,5 |
0,212 |
3 |
Other
transport modes |
1250,8 |
6,563 |
0,3 |
0,02 |
0,653 |
1,48 |
0,44 |
2,7 |
Other
market services |
2172,9 |
16,512 |
0,3 |
0,05 |
1,642 |
|
|
|
Other
non-market services |
1331,8 |
10,1 |
0,3 |
0,03 |
1,004 |
|
|
|
TOTAL |
13159,3 |
100 |
|
3,017 |
100 |
100 |
|
|
Contribution
of the motor roads to G.D.P. |
|
|
3,02% |
|
|
|
|
|
Road costs |
|
|
1,93% |
|
|
|
|
|
Regional
"road assets" |
|
|
1,09% |
|
|
|
|
|
Table 2. Share of
the road network component in the cost price of products in
10 regions of the CIS.
Branches |
Share
of the road network component, % |
||
Max |
Min |
Typical |
|
Timber
cutting |
27 |
8 |
22 |
Diary
products |
27 |
7,8 |
8,6 |
Meat production |
12,3 |
6,6 |
8 |
Grain |
16 |
1 |
4,2 |
Vegetable
production |
10,2 |
1,5 |
5,6 |
Construction |
35 |
2 |
9,5 |
Automobile
transportation |
82* |
7,6 |
35 |
* - 99,6% - dirt roads (natural) – the
Uilsk district of the Aktubinsk oblast in Kazakhstan.